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I N the early morning hours of June 21, 1990, long after they had put their five children to bed, Russ and LauraJones were awak-
ened by voices outside their house. I Russ got up, went to his 
bedroom window and peered into the dark.2 "I saw a glow," he 
recalled.3 There, in the middle of his yard, was a burning cross.4 
The Joneses are black.5 In the spring of 1990 they had moved 
into their four-bedroom, three-bathroom dream house on 290 
Earl Street in St. Paul, Minnesota.6 They were the only black fam-
ily on the block. Two weeks after they had settled into their 
predominantly white neighborhood, the tires on both their cars 
were slashed.7 A few weeks later, one of their cars' windows was 
shattered, and a group of teenagers had walked past their house 
and shouted "nigger" at their nine-year-old son.8 And now this 
burning cross. Russ Jones did not have to guess at the meaning 
of this symbol of racial hatred.9 There is not a black person in 
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9. The history and meaning behind the symbol of the burning cross is well 
known. For more than 125 years racist groups have used this symbol in their 
terroristic campaigns against the black population. See generally DAVID M. CHAL-
MERS, HOODED AMERICANISM: THE HISTORY OF THE Ku KLUX KLAN 424 (1981) 
(recounting Klan's history as "secret, terrorist society dedicated to maintaining 
white rule in United States"); JAMES RIDGEWAY, BLOOD IN THE FACE: THE Ku 
KLUX KLAN, ARYAN NATIONS, NAZI SKINHEADS, AND THE RISE OF A NEW WHITE 
CULTURE 7-8 (1990) (describing history of different far right racist organizations 
in American society and politics); PATSY SIMS, THE KLAN 5-8 (1978) (viewing 
members of Ku Klux Klan and terror they invoke from insider's perspective). 
Courts have also recognized the historical significance of the burning cross: 
"[A] black American would be particularly susceptible to the threat of cross 
burning because of the historical connotations of violence associated with the 
act. . . . [T]he act has a special capacity to evoke terror among black Ameri-
(787) 
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America who has not been taught the significance of this instru-
ment of persecution and intimidation, who has not had embla-
zoned on his mind the image of black men's scorched bodies 
hanging from trees, and who does not know the story of Emmett 
Till. JO One can only imagine the terror which RussellJones must 
have felt as he watched the flames and thought of the vulnerabil-
ity of his family and of the hateful, cowardly viciousness of those 
who would attack him and those he loved under cover of 
darkness. 
This assault on Russ Jones and his family begins the story of 
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 11 the "hate speech" case recently decided 
by the United States Supreme Court. The Joneses, however, are 
not the subject of the Court's opinion. The constitutional injury 
addressed in R.A. V. was not this black family's right to live where 
they pleased,12 or their right to associate with their neighborsY' 
The Court was not concerned with how this attack might impede 
the exercise of the Joneses' constitutional right to be full and val-
ued participants in the political community, 14 for it did not view 
cans .... 'There is a history of violence and intimidation which is directed 
against blacks and which is symbolized by a burning cross.''' United States v. 
Salyer, 893 F.2d 113, 116 (6th Cir. 1989). A victim ofa cross burning stated her 
belief that "a lot of the cross burnings in the south during the civil rights move-
ment preceded hangings and that sort of thing. Of course, being a black, that is 
what it calls to mind." United States v. Lee, 935 F.2d 952, 956 n.5, (8th Cir.) 
(quoting trial record at 354), vacated in part, reh'gen bane granted in part, 1991 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 18740 (8th Cir. Aug. 14, 1991). 
10. Emmett Till, a 14-year-old boy from Chicago, was killed while visiting 
relatives in Mississippi in 1955. His alleged "wolf whistle" at a white woman 
provoked his murderer. CONRAD LYNN, THERE IS A FOUNTAIN: THE AUTOBIOG-
RAPHY OF A CIVIL RIGHTS LAWVER 155 (1979); see also STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, A 
DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETT TILL (1988) (recounting story of 
black teenager murdered for allegedly whistling at white woman). 
II. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). 
12. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252 (1977) (stating that proof of racially discriminatory intent in village's 
refusal to rezone housing area is required to prove violation of Equal Protection 
Clause); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (prohibiting monetary dam-
ages for breach of racially restrictive housing covenant); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 
U.S. I, 23 (1948) (prohibiting state enforcement of racially restrictive housing 
covenant in equity); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (holding state 
housing segregation ordinance unconstitutional). 
13. Broad rights of association have been protected by the Supreme Court. 
See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (protecting voluntary group 
membership lists from state inspection); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 
(1963) (court finding "impediments to the exercise of one's right to choose 
one's associates can violate the right of association protected by the First 
Amendment"); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 449 (1958) (dicta 
identifying broad associational rights of individuals in family settings). 
14. Existing equality law has long recognized that practices similar to cross-
burning constitute violations of their victims' civil rights. Title 42 U.S.C. 
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R.A. V. as a case about the Joneses' injury., Instead, the Court was 
concerned primarily with the alleged constitutional injury to 
those who assaulted the Joneses, that is, the First Amendment 
rights of the crossburners.15 
§ 1971 (b) provides that "no person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or attempt 
to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any other person for the purpose of interfering 
with the right of such other person to vote or to vote as he may choose .... " 42 
U.S.C. § 1971(b) (1988). This provision has been invoked where sharecropper-
tenants in possession of real estate under contract are threatened, intimidated, 
or coerced by landlords for the purposes of interfering with their rights of 
franchise. United States v. Bruce, 353 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. 
Beaty, 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961). Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(b) provides for 
an action for threatened loss of equal access to public facilities. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000(b) (1988). Cross burning to exclude persons from access to housing is 
covered under 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (a), which prevents intimidation of "any person 
because of his race, color, religion, sex" from exercising rights to fair housing. 
42 U.S.C. § 3631(a) (1988). 
15. Respondent's (Saint Paul, Minnesota) brief before the United States 
Supreme Court offered the following two questions: 
1. Mayan enactment that has been authoritatively interpreted as pro-
scribing conduct that constitutes fighting words and incites immi-
nent lawless action be sustained, on its face, against claims that it is 
substantially overbroad and impermissibly vague? 
2. Is such an enactment narrowly tailored to serve the compelling in-
terest of protecting victims of bias-motivated harassment against vi-
olation of their basic individual rights, which, on balance, far 
outweigh any minimally protected expression on the part of the 
accused? 
Brief for Respondent at 1, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (No. 
90-7675). Similarly, the brief amicus curiae of the Anti-Defamation League sup-
porting respondent stated as a question presented: 
May a local government criminalize, the act of burning a cross on the 
private property of a black family under an ordinance limited by the 
state's highest court to prohibit only fighting words or conduct directed 
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and likely to incite or 
produce such action? 
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Anti-Defamation League ofB'nai B'rith in support of 
Respondent at i, R.A. V. (No. 90-7675). Not surprisingly, the ACLU argued as 
amicus that the issue before the Court was that "[t]he ordinance, as written, 
sweeps within its ambit whole categories of free speech." R.A.V. (No. 90-7675). 
Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union, Minnesota Civil Liber-
ties Union, and American Jewish Congress, in Support of Petitioner at 7, R.A. V. 
(No. 90-7675). The ACLU further asserted that the "ordinance targets only 
communicative activity" rather than protecting basic liberties and rights of citi-
zens. /d. at 8. All of these phrasings of the issue before the Court stand in 
contrast to the Minnesota Supreme Court's view of the salient issue. That court 
stated "[b]urning a cross in the yard of an African American family's home is 
deplorable conduct that the City of St. Paul may without question prohibit. The 
burning cross is itself an unmistakable symbol of violence and hatred based on 
virulent notions of racial supremacy." In re R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Minn. 
1991), rev'd, R.A.v., 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). 
Interestingly, the principals to the incident did not share the Court's confu-
sion about what was at stake. Their words and actions reflect the human cost 
and pain that attended this act. The Joneses spoke of the fear caused by the 
incident and how it resulted in their II-year-old son's "loss of innocence." 
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There is much that is deeply troubling about Justice Scalia's 
majority opinion in R.A. V. 16 But it is the utter disregard for the 
silenced voice of the victims that is most frightening. Nowhere in 
the opinion is any mention made of the Jones family or of their 
constitutional rights. 17 Nowhere are we told of the history of the 
Ku Klux Klan or of its use of the burning cross as a tool for the 
suppression of speech. Justice Scalia turns the First Amendment 
on its head, transforming an act intended to silence through ter-
ror and intimidation into an invitation to join a public discus-
sion. 18 In so doing, he clothes the crossburner's terroristic act in 
Paula Chin et aI., A Crime of Hate, PEOPLE, Jan. 13, 1992, at 66, 68. The perpetra-
tor's parents apparently recognized this pain in forcing their son to go to the 
Joneses to apologize. Id. at 68. The People article also identified the pain that the 
cross burning incident caused to the perpetrator's family. It contributed to a 
separation of the perpetrator's parents. Id. Furthermore, the seventeen-year-old 
offender quit his job and moved out of the family home. /d. Apparently the 
perpetrator's parents, at least for a time, lost track of their son's whereabouts. 
Id. For all these people, this is only secondarily a "free speech" issue, if at all. 
16. The internal incoherence of Justice Scalia's opinion and its ruthlessly 
unprincipled revision of settled First Amendment principles are well docu-
mented in concurring opinions signed by four of his colleagues. Justices White, 
Blackmun, O'Connor and Stevens agree that the statute as drafted, was constitu-
tionally infirm. However, they would have invalidated the statute as an over-
broad regulation of clearly regulable speech. "This case could easily be decided 
within the contours of established First Amendment law by holding, as peti-
tioner argues, that the St. Paul ordinance is fatally overbroad because it 
criminalizes not only unprotected expression but expression protected by the 
First Amendment." R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550 (O'Connor,J., concurring). But 
the concurring Justices could not stand silently by while the majority sought to 
simultaneously render inoperative much of antidiscrimination law and lay the 
groundwork for significant incursions on the protection of the First Amend-
ment. Justice Blackmun noted that the Court's majority had decided that "a 
State cannot regulate speech that causes great harm unless it also regulates 
spech that does not (setting law and logic on their heads), ... this weakens the 
traditional protections of speech." /d. at 2560 (B1ackmun, j., concurring). Jus-
tice Stevens called Justice Scalia's misguided tour through the First Amendment 
precedents "an adventure in doctrinal wonderland," an apt description that can 
only be faulted to the extent that its reference to Lewis Carroll's fantasy distracts 
from the serious danger the opinion poses to both free speech and equality. Id. 
at 2562. 
17. The sole reference to the Joneses in the majority opinion is contained 
in the second sentence. "They [the petitioner and several other teenagers] then 
allegedly burned the cross inside the fenced yard of a black family that lived 
across the street from the house where the petitioner was staying." /d. at 2541. 
18. Justice White's concurring opinion captures the way in which the major-
ity transforms an act of coercion and intimidation into high-value political 
speech. He observes that "the Court's new 'underbreadth' creation serves no 
desirable function. Instead, it permits, indeed invites, the continuation of ex-
pressive conduct that in this case is evil and worthless in First Amendment terms 
.... Indeed, by characterizing fighting words as a form of 'debate,' ... the 
majority legitimates hate speech as a form of public discussion." Id. at 2553-54. 
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the legitimacy of protected political speech and invites him to 
burn again. 
"Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a 
cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible"19 writes Justice 
Scalia at the close of his opinion. I am skeptical about his concern 
for the victims. These words seem little more than an obligatory 
genuflection to decency. For even in this attempt to assure the 
reader of his good intentions, Justice Scalia's words betray his in-
ability to see theJoneses or hear their voices. "Burning a cross in 
someone's front yard is reprehensible," he says. It is reprehensible 
but not injurious, or immoral, or violative of the Joneses' rights. 
For Justice Scalia, the identity of the "someone" is irrelevant. As 
is the fact that it is a cross that is burned. 
When I first read Justice Scalia' opinion it felt as if another 
cross had just been set ablaze. This cross was burning on the 
pages of U.S. Reports. It was a cross like the cross that Justice 
Taney had burned in 1857,20 and that which Justice Brown had 
burned in 1896.21 Its message: "You have no rights which a 
white man is bound to respect (or protect).22 If you are injured 
by this assaultive act, the injury is a figment of your imagination 
that is not constitutionally cognizable. "23 
For the past couple of years I have been struggling to find a 
way to talk to rpy friends in the civil liberties community about the 
injuries which are ignored in the R.A. V. case. I have tried to artic-
19. Id. at 2550. 
20. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
21. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
22. Justice Taney, in holding that African Americans were not included and 
were not intended to be included under the word "citizen" in the Constitution, 
and could therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instru-
ment provides for and secures opined, "[the colored race] had for more than a 
century before been regarded as being of an inferior order, and altogether unfit 
to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far 
inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." 
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407. 
23. In rejecting plaintiffs argument in Plessy v. Ferguson that enforced sepa-
ration of the races constituted a badge of inferiority Judge Brown stated, "[i]f 
this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the 
colored race chooses to put that construction upon it." Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551. 
Justice Scalia's opinion contains this same dismissive argument. Responding to 
the City's arument that the ordinance is intended to protect against victimization 
of persons who are particularly vulnerable because of membership in a group 
that historically has been discriminated against, Justice Scalia stated that "it is 
clear that the St. Paul ordinance is not directed to the secondary effects .... 
The emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a secondary effect.'" 
R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549. The argument here, like that in Plessy, is that the only 
injury here is in black folks' heads. 
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ulate the ways in which hate speech harms its victims and the ways 
in which it harms us all by undermining core values in our 
Constitution.24 
The first of these values is full and equal citizenship ex-
pressed in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 
When hate speech is employed with the purpose and effect of 
maintaining established systems of caste and subordination, it vi-
olates that core value. Hate speech often prevents its victims 
from exercising legal rights guaranteed by the Constitution and 
civil rights statutes.25 The second constitutional value threatened 
by hate speech is the value of free expression itself. Hate speech 
frequently silences its victims, who, more often than not, are 
those who are already heard from least.26 An understanding of 
both of these injuries is aided by the methodologies of feminism 
and critical race theory that give special attention to the struc-
tures of subordination and the voices of the subordinated.27 
My own understanding of the need to inform the First 
24. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist 
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 Uune 1990) [hereinafter If He Hollers]; see 
also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) [hereinafter The !d, the Ego and 
Equal Protection]. 
25. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 
26. Elsewhere I have argued that racist speech disserves the purposes of the 
First Amendment in at least two other ways. First, such speech has an immedi-
ate injurious impact which precludes intermediary reflection on the thought con-
veyed and the opportunity for responsive speech. Second, to the extent they 
succeed in their purpose, racial insults intimidate and therefore infect the mar-
ketplace of ideas by making it unlikely that a dialogue will follow. Lawrence, If 
He Hollers, supra note 24, at 452. 
27. CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (forthcoming June 
1993; manuscript at 22, on file with author); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 27 (1979) 
(explaining why sexual harassment from men silences female victims); Kimberle 
Crenshaw, Beyond Racism and Misogyny: Black Feminism and 2 Live Crew, BOSTON 
REV., Dec. 1991, at 6, 33 (illustrating how debate over 2 Live Crew plays role in 
rendering black women voiceless); Richard Delgado, Worm that Wound: A Tort 
Actionfor Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 
135- 49 (1982) (indicating that hate speech victims often suffer anti-social behav-
ioral and psychological problems); Robert V. Guthrie, White Racism and Its Impact 
on Black and White Behavior, 1 J. NON-WHITE CONCERNS 144, 146 (1973) (illustrat-
ing how overt discrimination forced black parent to accept that Black children 
used inferior educational facilities); Jean C. Love, Discriminatory Speech and the Tort 
of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 123, 159 
(1990) (recommending rebuttable presumption that certain categories of dis-
criminatory speech constitute outrageous conduct for purposes of tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist 
Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2337 (1989) (detail-
ing adverse effects that hate speech has on its victims). 
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Amendment discourse with the insights of an antisubordination 
theory began in the context of the debate over the regulation of 
hate speech on campus. As I lectured at universities throughout 
the United States, I learned of serious racist and anti-Semitic hate 
incidents.28 Students who had been victimized told me of swasti-
kas appearing on Jewish holy days.29 Stories of cross burnings, 
racist slurs and vicious verbal assaults made me cringe even as I 
heard them secondhand. Universities, long the home of institu-
tional and euphemistic racism, were witnessing the worst forms of 
gutter racism. In 1990, the Chronicle of Higher Education re-
ported that approximately 250 colleges and universities had ex-
perienced serious racist incidents since 1986,30 and the National 
Institute Against Prejudice and Violence estimated that 25% of 
all minority students are victimized at least once during an aca-
demic year. 31 
I urged my colleagues to hear these students' voices and ar-
gued that Brown v. Board of Education32 and its antidiscrimination 
principle identified an injury of constitutional dimension done to 
these students that must be recognized and remedied.33 We do 
28. See Constance C.R. White, The New Racists, Ms., Oct. 1987, at 68 
(describing racist incidents at University of Michigan, University of Massachu-
setts at Amherst, University of Wisconsin, University of New Mexico, Columbia 
University, Wellesley College, Duke University and University of California at 
Los Angeles); KLANWATCH INTELLIGENCE REPORT No. 42, Feb. 1988 (reporting 
numerous reports of racial and anti-Semitic incidents, including Aryan Resist-
ance literature being distributed at Stanford University and bomb threats made 
on Jewish Student Union at Memphis State University); Jon Wiener, Racial Ha-
tred on Campus, THE NATION, Feb. 27, 1989, at 260,260 (recounting student pub-
lication's ridicule of African-American professor at Dartmouth College and 
attempted intimidation of academic counselor at Purdue University, where 
"Death Nigger" was scratched on her office door). This is, of course, only a 
modest selection of such incidents. It is interesting to note that hate speech is 
directed at the institutionally empowered (professors) as well as the relatively 
powerless (students). 
29. Sophia M. Fischer, An Outbreak of Anti-Semitic Incidents, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
13, 1992, § 13NJ, at I;Jessie Mangaliman & Rose Kim, Vandalism Now Called Bias 
Crime, NEWSDAY, Oct. 7, 1992, at 31; Boy Who Burned Down Synagogue Given Proba-
tion Amid Protests, THE REUTERS LIBRARY REPORT, March I, 1989. 
30. Howard J. Uhrlich, Campus Ethnoviolence and the Policy Options, 4 NAT'L 
INST. AGAINST PREJUDICE & VIOLENCE iii (1990). 
31. Id. According to Howard J. Uhrlich, Ph.D., of the National Institute 
Against Prejudice and Violence, minority students have been the target of "ver-
bal harassment, cross-burnings, hate literature, beatings, brawls, anti-homosex-
ual graffiti, swastikas and racially-motivated slurs." Deb Riechmann, Colleges 
Tackle Increase in Racism on Campuses, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1989 (Bulldog Ed.), 
Part I, at 36. 
32. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that separate educational facilities 
are inherently unequal and deprive plaintiffs of equal protection under law). 
33. Lawrence, If He Hollers, supra note 24, at 438-41,462-66. 
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not normally think of Brown as being a case about speech. Most 
narrowly read, it is a case about the rights of black children to 
equal educational opportunity. But Brown teaches us another 
very important lesson: that the harm of segregation is achieved by 
the meaning of the message it conveys.34 The Court's opinion in 
Brown stated that racial segregation is unconstitutional not be-
cause the "physical separation of black and white children is bad 
or because resources were distributed unequally among black and 
white schools. Brown held that segregated schools were unconsti-
tutional primarily because of the message segregation conveys---:-
the message that black children are an untouchable caste, unfit to 
be educated with white children. "35 Segregation stamps a badge 
of inferiority upon blacks.36 This badge communicates a message 
to others that signals their exclusion from the community of 
citizens.37 
The "Whites Only" signs on the lunch counter, swimming 
pool and drinking fountain convey the same message. The an-
tidiscrimination principle articulated in Brown presumptively enti-
tles every individual to be treated by the organized society as a 
34. ld. at 439. In an earlier discussion of this same subject, I stated: 
The prevention of stigma was at the core of the Supreme Court's unani-
mous decision in [Brown] ... that segregated public schools are inher-
ently unequal. Observing that the segregation of black pupils 
"generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community," 
... Chief Justice Warren recognized what a majority of the Court had 
ignored almost sixty years earlier in [Plessy] ... : The social meaning of 
racial segregation in the United States is the designation of a superior 
and an inferior caste, and segregation proceeds "on the ground that 
colored citizens are ... inferior and degraded." ... Note that while 
formal, legally sanctioned segregation was the chief form of stigmatiza-
tion prior to Brown and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ... the system has 
yet to be dismantled, and other stigmatizing mechanisms-including 
the exclusion of blacks from private clubs, privately enforced housing 
discrimination, and deprecating portrayals of blacks in the media-have 
reinforced its effects. ld. at 439 n.37 (citations omitted). 
35. ld. at 439. 
36. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
37. !d.; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (stating that social meaning of racial segregation in United States is 
designation of superior and inferior caste, and segregation proceeds "on the 
ground that colored citizens are ... inferior."). For a discussion of the "cultural 
meaning" of segregation, see Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation 
Decisions, 69 YALE LJ. 421, 427 (1960); Charles R. Lawrence III, Segregation "Mis-
understood": The Milliken Decision Revisited, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 15, 18 (1977) (recog-
nizing that institution of racial segregation injures blacks by labeling them 
inferior and that, once established, institution is self-perpetuating); Richard A. 
Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 
24 UCLA L. REV. 581 (1977) (discussing system of racial segregation in United 
States). 
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respected, responsible and participating member. This is the 
principle upon which all our civil rights laws rest. It is the guiding 
principle of the Equal Protection Clause's requirement of nondis-
criminatory government action.38 In addition, it has been applied 
in regulating private discrimination.39 
The words "Women Need Not Apply" in a job announce-
ment,40 the racially exclusionary clause in a restrictive covenant41 
and the racial epithet scrawled on the locker of the new black em-
ployee at a previously all-white job site42 all convey a political 
message. But we treat these messages as "discriminatory prac-
tices" and outlaw them under federal and state civil rights legisla-
tion because they are more than speech.43 In the context of social 
. inequality, these verbal and symbolic acts form integral links in 
historically ingrained systems of social discrimination. They work 
to keep traditionally victimized groups in socially isolated, stigma-
tized and disadvantaged positions through the promotion of fear, 
intolerance, degradation and violence. The Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the disestablish-
ment of these practices and systems.44 Likewise, the First Amend-
ment does not prohibit our accomplishment of this compelling 
constitutional interest simply because those discriminatory prac-
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
229, 239 (1976) (holding that law is not unconstitutional solely because of ra-
cially disproportionate impact); Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (holding that "separate 
but equal" doctrine has no place in field of public education"). 
39. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
40. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (supporting regulation of gender-specific "Help 
Wanted" advertising). 
41. See, e.g., Burrows v.Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 251-52 (1953) (holding that 
enforcement of covenant forbidding use of real estate by non-Caucasians, by 
state action, violates Fourteenth Amendment); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I, 
4-5 (1948) (private agreements restricting ownership of property based on race 
violates Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). 
42. See, e.g., Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(holding employer liable for acts of racial harassment by employees). 
43. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 201-207, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-
2000a-6 (1988) (public accommodations); id. §§ 601-606, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-
2000d-7 (1988) (federally assisted programs); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 
(equal employment opportunities). None of these regulations have been struck 
down as an unconstitutional infringement of an individual's speech or associa-
tion rights. 
44. For a discussion of the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause in 
this regard, see KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 4 (1989) (stressing 
importance of Equal Protection Clause); Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race and 
Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. I, 1 (1988) (stating that Fourteenth Amend-
ment forbids organized society from treating people as members of inferior 
caste). 
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tices are achieved through the use of words and symbols.45 
The primary intent of the cross burner in R.A. V. was not to 
enter into a dialogue with the Joneses, or even with the larger 
community, as it arguably was in Brandenburg v. Ohio.46 His pur-
pose was to intimidate-to cast fear in the hearts of his victims, to 
drive them out of the community, to enforce the practice of resi-
dential segregation, and to encourage others to join him in the 
enforcement of that practice.47 The discriminatory impact of this 
45. Private parties have been successfully prosecuted for activities that are 
arguably within the confines of the First Amendment. See generally Delgado, supra 
note 27, at 133-34, 150-65 (arguing that an independent tort action for racial 
insults is permissible and necessary); Matsuda, supra note 27, at 2320, 2327-30. 
See also Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (cook sued employer 
for calling him "nigger" and menacing him repeatedly for emotional distress 
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Wiggs v. Courshon, 355 F. Supp. 206 (S.D. 
Fla. 1973) (black family called "bunch of niggers" and father called "black son-
of-a-bitch" by waitress sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
received reduced verdict of$2,500); Gomez v. Hug, 645 P.2d 916 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1982) (Mexican-American sued individual for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress for calling him "fucking spic," "Mexican greaser" and "pile of shit"); 
Dominguez v. Stone, 638 P.2d 423 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (Mexican national re-
siding in U.S. sued individual for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
when that person publicly questioned her employment and suggested she 
should be a janitor due to her ethnic origin). 
46. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The Court found Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism 
Act unconstitutional on the ground that it failed to distinguish between the ad-
vocacy of ideas to the larger community, even the advocacy of the necessity and 
propriety of resorting to violence, and the advocacy that is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such action. Id. at 
448-49. In doing so, the Court overturned the conviction of a Klansman who 
stated in an address to a public gathering of Klansmen that, if the government 
continued to suppress white people, "it's possible that there might have to be 
some revengeance [sic] taken." Id. at 446. 
47. Justice Stevens in his concurrence observed that "the cross-burning in 
this case-directed as it was to a single African-American family trapped in their 
home--was nothing more than a crude form of physical intimidation." R.A. V. , 
112 S. Ct. at 2569 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
[T]he "content" of the "expressive conduct" represented by a "burn-
ing cross" ... is not less than the first step in an act of racial violence. 
It was an unfortunately still is the equivalent of [the] waving of a knife 
before the thrust, the pointing of a gun before it is fired, the lighting of 
a match before the arson, the hanging of the noose before the lynching. 
It is not a political statement, or even a cowardly statement of hatred. 
It is the first step in an act of assault. It can be no more protected than 
holding a gun to a victim['s] head. 
Jd.; cf Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) 
(holding that speech likely to encourage racial segregation may not be banned 
and that ordinance, which prohibited posting of real estate "For Sale" and 
"Sold" signs to promote racial integration by discouraging white flight, was un-
constitutional). The signs could not be banned because they were messages to 
the larger community and thus protected under the rubric of Brandenburg. How-
ever, in R.A. V., the burning of the cross was not a message advocated to the 
larger community but was a direct message of intimidation and threat. Courts 
have consistently refused to protect expressive activity that constitutes a threat 
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speech is of even more importance than the speaker's intent.48 In 
protecting victims of discrimination, it is the presence of this dis-
criminatory impact, which is a compelling governmental interest 
unrelated to the suppression of the speaker's political message, 
that requires a balancing of interests rather than a presumption 
against constitutionality.49 This is especially true when the inter-
ests that compete with speech are also interests of constitutional 
dimension. 50 
One such interest is in enforcing the antidiscrimination prin-
ciple. Those opposed to the regulation of hate speech often view 
the interest involved as the maintenance of civility, the protection 
of sensibilities from offense, or the prohibition of group defama-
tion. But this analysis misconstrues the nature of the injury. 
"Defamation-injury to group reputation-is not the same as dis-
crimination-injury to group status and treatment." The former 
"is more ideational and less material" than the latter, "which rec-
ognizes the harm of second-class citizenship and inferior social 
standing with the attendant deprivation of access to resources, 
voice, and power."51 
to another, even where an actual intent to do harm is lacking. See, e.g., Ladner v. 
United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958). 
48. Even the majority in R.A. V. admits that speech can be regulated when 
the government's purpose is to prohibit proscribable conduct when it argues 
that "a valid basis for according differential treatment to even a content-defined 
subclass of proscribable speech is that the subclass happens to be associated 
with particular 'secondary effects' of the speech, so that the regulation is 'justified 
without reference to the content of the speech.' R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546 (cita-
tions omitted). [S]ince words can in some circumstances violate laws directed 
not against speech but against conduct ... , a particular content-based subcat-
egory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the 
reach of the statute directed at conduct rather than speech." [d. If we are to 
take the majority at its word the St. Paul ordinance could be saved simply by 
redrafting it within the context of a larger statute regulating conduct (including 
speech) intended to deprive certain individuals of their civil rights. 
49. In a previous discussion of this issue, I noted: 
When the Klan burns a cross on the lawn of a black person who ... 
[has] exercised his right to move to a formerly all-white neighborhood, 
the effect of this speech does not result from' the persuasive power of an 
idea operating freely in the market. It is a threat, a threat made in the 
context of a history of lynching, beatings, and economic reprisals that 
made good on earlier threats, a threat that silences a potential speaker. 
Lawrence, If He Hollers, supra note 24, at 471-72. 
50. [d. at 480-81. 
51. Brief for the National Black Women's Health Project as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent at 15, RAV. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) 
(No. 90-7675). The brief continued: 
Certainly, being treated as a second-class citizen furthers the second-
class reputation of the group of which one is a member, even as a 
demeaned reputation permits and encourages social denigration and 
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The Title VII paradigm of "hostile environment" discrimina-
tion best describes the injury to which victims of racist, sexist and 
homophobic hate speech are subjected. When plaintiffs in em-
ployment discrimination suits have been subjected to racist or 
sexist verbal harassment in the workplace, courts have recognized 
that such assaultive speech denies the targeted individual equal 
access to employment. These verbal assaults most often occur in 
settings where the relatively recent and token integration of the 
workplace makes the victim particularly vulnerable and where the 
privately voiced message of denigration and exclusion echoes the 
whites-only and males-only practices that were all-too-recently of-
ficial policy. 52 
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 53 a Title VII case that 
appears to be headed for review in the Supreme Court, presents a 
clear example of the tension between the law's commitment to 
free speech and its commitment to equality. Lois Robinson, a 
welder, was one of a very small number of female skilled 
craftworkers employed by Jacksonville Shipyards. She brought 
suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that 
her employer had created and encouraged a sexually hostile, in-
timidating work environment. 54 A U.S. District Court ruled in 
her favor, finding that the presence in the workplace of pictures of 
women in various stages of undress and in sexually suggestive or 
submissive poses, as well as remarks made by male employees and 
supervisors which demeaned women, constituted a violation of 
Title VII "through the maintenance of a sexually hostile work en-
vironment."55 Much of District Court Judge Howell Melton's 
opinion is a recounting of the indignities that Ms. Robinson and 
five other women experienced almost daily while working with 
850 men over the course of ten years.56 In addition to the omni-
present display of sexually explicit drawings, graffiti, calendars, 
!d. 
exclusion. But equality is an interest of Constitutional dimension; re-
pute, however weighty, is not. The failure to recognize the equality 
interest at stake in 'group libel' statutes ... has trivialized the harm and 
obscured the state interest, disabling the constitutional defense of such 
laws against First Amendment attack. 
52. For example, in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 
1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991), the plaintiff, Lois Robinson, was one of just six women 
working with over 850 men. 
53. [d. 
54. [d. at 1490. 
55. [d. at 1491. 
56. [d. at 1494-1501. 
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centerfold-style pictures, magazines and cartoons, the trial record 
contains a number of incidents in which sexually suggestive pic-
tures and comments were directed at Robinson. 57 Male employ-
ees admitted that the shipyard was "a boys' club" and "more or 
less a man's world."58 
The local chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) appealed the District Court's decision, arguing that 
"even sexists have a right to free speech."59 However, anyone 
who has read the trial record cannot help but wonder about these 
civil libertarians' lack of concern for Lois Johnson's right to do 
her work without being subjected to assault.60 
The trial record makes clear that Lois Robinson's male col-
leagues had little concern for advancing the cause of erotic 
speech when they made her the target of pornographic comments 
and graffiti. They wanted to put the usurper of their previously 
all-male domain in her place, to remind her of her sexual vulnera-
bility and to send her back home where she belonged. This 
speech, like the burning cross in R.A. V., does more than commu-
nicate an idea. It interferes with the victim's right to work at ajob 
where she is free from degradation because of her gender.61 
But it is not sufficient to describe the injury occasioned by 
57. Brieffor Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of 
Florida, Inc. and American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. at 3, Robinson v.Jackson-
ville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (No. 91-3655) [herein-
after ACLU's Amicus Curiae Brief]. 
58. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1493. 
59. Mike Graham, Sexism in Shipyards Sets off Legal Battle, THE TiMES 
(London), Nov. 24, 1991 (Overseas News section). 
60. The National ACLU, to its credit, has considered the civil liberties of 
the women working at this shipyard as well as those of the male employees who 
have claimed that the district court order violates their First Amendment rights. 
The national office parted company with the local branch, filing an amicus curiae 
brief in the appeal to the Eleventh Circuit which argues that "in certain very 
narrow circumstances expressive activity may be restricted. One example is 
speech that itself effectuates unlawful activity - including employment discrimi-
nation." ACLU's Amicus Curiae Brief at 12, Robinson (No. 91-3655). The brief 
goes on to argue that the district court did not apply the appropriate standard in 
determining liability but notes that "the record does contain testimony that 
could be relied upon ... in conducting the proper inquiry." !d. at 18. Finally 
the brief argues that the district court's remedial order is not sufficiently nar-
rowly tailored. !d. at 19-23. 
61. Justice Scalia distinguished the Title VII hostile environment cases 
from R.A. V. arguing that in those cases "sexually derogatory words 'fighting 
words,' among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII's general pro-
hibition against sexual discrimination in employment practices. . . . Where the 
government does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts 
are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory 
idea or philosophy." R.A.V. v. City o/St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. at 2541. 
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hate speech only in terms of the countervailing value of equality. 
There is also an injury to the First Amendment. When Russ 
Jones looked out his window and saw that burning cross, he heard 
a message that said, "Shut up, black man, or risk harm to you and your 
family." It may be that Russ Jones is especially brave, or especially 
foolhardy, and that he may speak even more loudly in the face of 
this threat. But it is more likely that he will be silenced, and that 
we will lose the benefit of his voice. 
Professor Laurence H. Tribe has identified two values pro-
tected by the First Amendment.62 The first is the intrinsic value 
of speech, which is the value of individual self expression.63 
Speech is intrinsically valuable as a manifestation of our humanity 
and our individuality. The second is the instrumental value of 
speech. The First Amendment protects dissent to maximize pub-
lic discourse, and to achieve the great flowering of debate and 
ideas that we need to make our democracy work.64 Both of these 
values are implicated in the silencing of Russ Jones by his noctur-
nal attacker. 
For African-Americans, the intrinsic value of speech as self-
expression and self-definition has been particularly important. 
The absence of a "black voice" was central to the ideology of Eu-
ropean-American racism, an ideology that denied Africans their 
humanity and thereby justified their enslavement.65 African-
American slaves were prevented from learning to read and write, 
and they were prohibited from engaging in forms of self-expres-
sion that might instill in them a sense of self-worth and pride. 
Their silence and submission was then interpreted as evidence of 
their subhuman status. The use of the burning cross as a method 
of disempowerment originates, in part, in the perpetrators' un-
derstanding of how, in the context of this ideology, their victims 
are rendered subhuman when they are silenced.66 When, in the 
face of threat and intimidation, the oppressors' victims are afraid 
to give full expression to their individuality, the oppressors 




65. See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Frederick Douglass and the Language of Self, in 
FIGURES IN BLACK: WORDS, SIGNS, AND THE "RACIAL" SELF 98, 104 (1987) (not-
ing that absence of collective black voice effectively allowed European philoso-
phers to deprive African slaves of their humanity). 
66. See Kendall Thomas, A House Divided Against Itself: A Comment on "Mas-
tery, Slavery, and Emancipation," 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1481, 1510-12 (1989) (ex-
plaining that black slave's humanity was destroyed when silenced). 
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achieve their purpose of denying the victims the liberty guaran-
teed to them by the Constitution. 
When the Joneses moved to Earl Street in St. Paul, they were 
expressing their individuality. When they chose their house and 
their neighbors, they were saying, "This is who we are. We are a 
proud black family and we want to live here." This self-expres-
sion and self-definition is the intrinsic value of speech. The in-
strumental value of speech is likewise threatened by this terrorist 
attack on the Joneses. Russ and Laura Jones also brought new 
voices to the political discourse in this St. Paul community. Ide-
ally, they will vote and talk politics with their neighbors. They will 
bring new experiences and new perspectives to their neighbor-
hood. A burning cross not only silences people like the Joneses, 
it improverishes the democratic process and renders our collec-
tive conversation less informed.67 
First Amendment doctrine and theory have no words for the 
injuries of silence imposed by private actors. There is no lan-
guage for the damage that is done to the First Amendment when 
the hateful speech of the crossburner or the sexual harasser si-
lences its victims. In antidiscrimination law, we recognize the ne-
cessity of regulating private behavior that threatens the values of 
equal citizenship.68 Fair housing laws,69 public accommodations 
provisions70 and employment discrimination laws7l all regulate 
the behavior of private actors. We recognize that much of the 
discrimination in our society occurs without the active participa-
tion of the state. We know that we could not hope to realize the 
constitutional ideal of equal citizenship if we pretended that the 
government was the only discriminator.72 
67. For a more detailed discussion of the ways in which racist speech infects 
and disrupts the marketplace of ideas, see Lawrence, If He Hollers, supra note 24, 
at 467-72. 
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6 (1988). 
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988). 
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1988). 
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988). 
72. Roughly stated: 
[The state action] doctrine holds that although someone may have suf-
fered harmful treatment of a kind that one might ordinarily describe as 
a deprivation of liberty or denial of equal protection of the laws, that 
occurrence excites no constitutional concern unless the proximate ac-
tive perpetrators of the harm include persons exercising the special au-
thority or power of the government of a state. 
Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: 
The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 306 (1989). This doc-
trine embodies the notion in American life and law that racial discrimination can 
be accurately divided into two spheres, "public" and "private." While this the-
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But there is no recognition in First Amendment law of the 
systematic private suppression of speech. Courts and scholars 
have worried about the heckler's veto,73 and, where there is lim-
ited access to speech fora, we have given attention to questions of 
equal time and the right to reply. 74 But for the most part, we act 
as if the government is the only regulator of speech, the only cen-
sor. 75 We treat the marketplace of ideas as if all voices are equal, 
as if there are no silencing voices or voices that are silenced.76 In 
the discourse of the First Amendment, there is no way to talk 
about how those who are silenced are always less powerful than 
those who do the silencing. First Amendment law ignores the 
ways in which patriarchy silences women, and racism silences 
people of color. When a woman's husband threatens to beat her 
ory seems to have value in the abstract, it fails to account for the way discrimina .. 
tion operates in the real world. Lawrence, If He Hollers, supra note 24, at 444-49; 
see also DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw 207-77 (2d ed. 
1980) (examining discrimination in administration of justice, including civil and 
criminal remedies available). 
73. See generally Eric Nesser, Chargingfor Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in 
the Marketplace of Ideas, 74 GEO. L. J. 257 (1985); Mark A. Rabinowitz, Nazis in 
Skokie: Fighting Words or Heckler's Veto?, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 259 (1979); Geoffrey 
R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 
(1983); Eve H. Lewin Wagner, Note, Heckling: A Protected Right or Disorderly Con-
duct? 60 S. CAL. L. REV., 215 (1986). 
74. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 385-86 (1969) (up-
holding FCC's "fairness doctrine," requiring that both sides of public issues be 
given fair coverage). 
75. Cf Thomas C. Grey, Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties: The Case of Discrimina-
tory Verbal Harassment, 8 Soc. PHIL. & POL'y 81, 104 (Issue 2, Spring 1991). Pro-
fessor Grey has spoken directly to this issue, noting that 
[u]nder the civil-rights perspective, defense of basic human rights is by 
no means simply a matter of limiting state power. Government may 
deny equal protection by omission as well as by action-for example, by 
refusing law enforcement protection to minorities. . . . [T]he civil-
rights approach, with its roots in anti-discrimination law and social pol-
icy, is centrally concerned with injuries of stigma and humiliation to 
those who are the victims of discrimination . . . . The point is not so 
much to protect a sphere of autonomy or personal security from intru-
sion as to protect potentially marginal members of the community from 
exclusion-from relegation, that is, to the status of second-class citizens. 
/d. at 82. 
/d. 
By contrast, for civil-libertarians 
[t]he active state is traditionally conceived as the sole or dominant 
threat to civil liberties. Civil libertarians do not spend much of their 
time or energy seeking ways to positively empower dissenters, deviants, 
and nonconformists against the pressures brought on them by unor-
ganized public opinion, or by private employers or landlords. 
76. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
206 (1989) (theorizing that words are given more protection under Constitution 
than acts). 
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the next time she contradicts him, a First Amendment injury has 
occurred.77 "Gay-bashing" keeps gays and lesbians "in the 
closet."78 It silences them. They are denied the humanizing ex-
perience of self-expression. We all are denied the insight and 
beauty of their voices. 
Professor Mari Matsuda has spoken compellingly of this 
problem in a telling personal story about the publication of her 
own thoughtful and controversial Michigan Law Review article on 
hate speech, "Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the 
Victim's Story."79 When she began working on the article, a men-
tor at Harvard Law School warned her not to use this topic for 
her tenure piece. "It's a lightning rod,"80 he told her. She fol-
lowed his advice, publishing the article years later, only after re-
ceiving her university tenure and when visiting offers from 
prestigious schools were in hand.S ) 
"What is the sound of a paper unpublished?" writes Profes-
sor Matsuda. "What don't we hear when some young scholar 
chooses tenure over controversial speech? Every fall, students re-
turn from summer jobs and tell me of the times they didn't speak 
out against racist or anti-Semitic comments, in protest over un-
fairness or ethical dilemmas. They tell of the times they were in-
vited to discriminatory clubs and went along in silence. What is 
the sound of all those silenced because they need a job? These 
silences, these things that go unsaid, aren't seen as First Amend-
ment issues. The absences are characterized as private and vol-
untary, beyond collective cure."82 
In the rush to protect the "speech" of crossburners, would-
be champions of the First Amendment must not forget the voices 
of their victims. If First Amendment doctrine and theory is to 
truly serve First Amendment ideals, it must recognize the injury 
77. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Is-
sue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1,93 (1991). "The most conservative figures 
estimate that women are physically abused in 12% of all marriages, and some 
scholars estimate that as many as 50% or more of all women will be battering 
victims at some point in their lives." Id. at 10·11; see also id. at IS·19 (exploring 
women's response of silence and denial to husbands' abuse in order to protect 
themselves from societal disapproval). 
7S. See Lawrence, If He Hollers, supra note 24, at 455 nn.96-97 (relating de-
scription of speech inhibiting impact hearer experienced when called "faggot" 
by man on subway). 
79. Matsuda, supra note 27, at 2320. 
SO. Mari Matsuda, "Who Owns Speech," Address at Hofstra School of Law, 
(Nov. 13 (1991)). 
S1. Id. 
S2.ld. 
804 VILLANOVA LAw REVIEW [Vol. 37: p. 787 
done by the private suppression of speech; it must take into ac-
count the historical reality that some members of our community 
are less powerful than others and that those persons continue to 
be systematically silenced by those who are more powerful. If we 
are truly committed to free speech, First Amendment doctrine 
and theory must be guided by the principle of antisubordination. 
There can be no free speech where there are still masters and 
slaves. 
